

ANOTHER ROAD TO POWER? ARMED CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES,
AND WOMEN'S PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION DEVELOPING NATIONS*

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ABSTRACT

Politics is arguably the arena in which gender inequality remains most pronounced. Yet in recent decades, women in some countries and regions of the world have made significant gains in their legislative presence at the national level. But for women living outside of the industrialized West, we know little about the processes that facilitate their entry into politics. Through separate analyses of 36 high-income, 86 middle-income, and 63 low-income countries, I demonstrate that past models of women's political representation fail to explain variation across low-income samples. I also explore two sets of factors that may be more salient predictors of women's parliamentary representation in low-income nations: civil war and international linkages. Although historically women have been unable to consolidate gains made during wartime into post-conflict political representation, I find that certain types of civil conflict during the 1980s and 1990s positively affect women's representation in low-income nations. Longer, larger-scale wars that contest the political system or serve to alter the composition of the government have the best prospects for creating opportunities for women to gain parliamentary seats. Both women's lack of political representation and the tragic effects of civil war remain enduring challenges faced by the developing world, but at the intersection of these two problems there is hope for women seeking political access.

ARMED CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES, AND WOMEN'S PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION DEVELOPING NATIONS

Politics is arguably the arena in which gender inequality remains most pronounced (Nelson and Chowdhury 1994; United Nations 1996, 1999). While women have entered educational institutions and the labor force in significant numbers, women only hold about 16% of the world's parliamentary seats (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2006). Women's underrepresentation is problematic not only because of the ideals of justice and equality, but research also demonstrates that women focus their efforts on different types of legislation than their male counterparts (Dodson 1991; O'Regan 2000; Swers 2002). If women are underrepresented in politics, issues such as sexual harassment, maternity leave, reproductive rights, and female health care may receive little attention. But even if men and women legislate in exactly the same way, women's presence in national political office has symbolic importance. In the U.S., for example, women demonstrate greater knowledge and interest in politics in districts with more female legislators (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). And in Uganda, the influx of women into local governance has improved both men's assessment of women's capacities and the aspirations and self-esteem of women (Johnson, Kabuchu, and Vusiya 2003).

It is encouraging, therefore, that women in some countries and regions of the world have made significant political gains in recent decades. For example, by January 2000, female parliamentary representation had exceeded thirty percent in all five Scandinavian nations. But progress has not been limited to Western industrialized countries. Women's legislative representation across Africa has increased more than tenfold since 1960, women's average levels of representation in South America are higher than in Europe, and in October 2003, the poor sub-

Saharan African nation of Rwanda elected women to 48.8 percent of the seats in its lower house (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2006; Tripp 2003).

But the rise of women to political power in non-Western and less developed countries is difficult to explain because our understanding of women's parliamentary representation cross-nationally is dominated by research on industrialized democracies (e.g., Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Norris 1985, 1987; Rule 1987; Siaroff 2000). Scholars have had only mixed success applying these models to broader cross-national samples that include developing countries (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Moore and Shackman 1996; Oakes and Almquist 1993; Paxton 1997; Reynolds 1999). And Matland (1998), who conducted one of the only separate analyses of a sample of less developed countries, found that none of the variables that were significant among industrialized democracies had an effect among his sample of 16 lesser-developed democracies.

In lesser developed countries such as Rwanda, one force which powerfully impacts women is civil conflict. In conflict situations, while men more often fight in combat, women are disproportionately the victims of sexual crimes such as rape and forced prostitution, and women are more often displaced as refugees. But while these conflicts are devastating to the populace, civil wars also serve as defining moments, turning points, and catalysts for change. Armed conflict often alters the very fabric of society, changing the ideas, beliefs, and social position of its members (Sambanis 2002). And for women, research has long documented that war allows women to operate outside of the constraints of traditional gender norms and to gain access to roles that were previously closed to them (e.g., Boyd 1989; Goetz 1995; Pankhurst 2002; Tripp 1994). Once conflict subsides, women have historically been excluded from the peacemaking process, limiting their incorporation into transitional legislative bodies and newly formed

governments (Geisler 1995; Waylen 1994). But there is also evidence that this is changing (Bauer 2004). By increasing the supply of female candidates, changing ideologies about women's place, and altering the opportunity structure to facilitate women's entry into the halls of power, civil wars may increase women's formal presence in national politics.

But the increasing inclusion of women into politics may also be a function of changing global norms. World polity research has demonstrated that connections to the world society through international organizations impact a range of state-level outcomes including women's political citizenship (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997; see also Bradley and Ramirez 1996; Finnemore 1999; Frank 1999; Frank and McEneaney 1999; Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992). And since the 1990s, the international women's movement has both pressured for more women in decision-making positions and advocated the adoption of gender quotas to guarantee women's inclusion in political bodies (Krook 2003, 2004). As the international women's movement has increasingly become intertwined with agents of world society such as the United Nations (United Nations 2000), women's political representation is incorporated into global notions of modernity and effective democratic governance (Towns 2003). But the impact of differential ties to the world polity on women's parliamentary representation has yet to be investigated. Across lesser developed or non-Western states, those that have greater connections to the world polity may be more likely to elect or appoint women to high-level political office.

In this paper, I suggest that previous cross-national research is inadequate in its explanation of variation across all regions and all levels of development. Therefore, I first examine the ability of past cross-national models to account for variation across all levels of development, extending Matland's (1998) analysis to investigate 36 high-income, 86 middle-income, and 63 low-income countries. But I also consider two sets of factors that may better

explain variance across low-income, non-Western countries: internal armed conflict and international linkages.

EXPLAINING WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Traditional Explanations

Varying levels of female participation in parliament are thought to result from differences in both the 'supply' of and the 'demand' for female candidates (Norris 1997; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Randall 1987). 'Supply' is determined by socioeconomic or structural factors. Because political elites are often highly educated and are concentrated in certain professions such as law, women's access to educational and professional opportunities affects their ability to stand for office (Putnam 1976). Moreover, gender stratification theorists suggest that women's presence in highly valued or indispensable positions in the labor force is a precursor to political equality (Blumberg 1984; Chafetz 1984). However, empirical evidence for the support of socioeconomic variables is mixed. Most research has found female labor force participation to be an important predictor of female parliamentary representation.¹ But with the exception of Rule (1981), no cross-national study has found a statistically significant effect of women's educational attainment. One important consideration is that past cross-national research has analyzed only the cases for which complete data has been available, and data are most likely to be missing for structural variables. Therefore, selection effects may play a role in the inconsistency of prior research.

Structural variables may also be problematic when compared across many nations. First, problems of definition and procedure are widely acknowledged in the collection of these measures, especially in developing countries (Anker 1983). Furthermore, measures for Western

Industrialized countries, such as the percentage of women in tertiary education or law, may be inappropriate when considering the Third World context, where the thresholds of who is 'educated' are much different. In Uganda, for example, the election of a woman to political leadership in one village was attributed in part to her education, which numbered only seven years (Johnson, Kabuchu, and Vusiya 2003). Finally, since women's labor force participation and education rises with development (Mammon and Paxson 2000), the incorporation of these measures in large cross-national samples may be capturing variation attributable to level of development, rather than to women's differential structural position.

In addition to supply-side factors, institutional differences in political systems may also create a different 'demand' for women (Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Political parties and electoral systems may be structured such that they enhance or limit the ability of groups in government to promote their own interests and therefore, they may be crucial factors in allowing women equal access (Caul 1999, 2001; Gallagher 1998; Kohn 1980; Kunovich and Paxton forthcoming). The existence of a proportional representation (PR) electoral system has often been found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on female parliamentary representation (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Matland 1993; Norris 1997; Paxton 1997; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Rule 1981, 1987).² The presence or dominance of left-oriented political parties, which are expected to express greater commitment to reducing gender inequality, have also been found to increase levels of female representation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Reynolds 1999; Rule 1987). In addition, affirmative action strategies such as national or party-level gender quotas have been increasingly employed across the world to increase women's representation and are receiving a great deal of scholarly attention (e.g. Caul 2001; Dahlerup

1994; Johnson, Kabuchu, and Vusiya 2003; Jones 2004; Krook 2003). Generally, political factors appear more significant than do socioeconomic or structural attributes.

In studies that have included developing countries and nations in transition, researchers have often examined the role of democracy. Because women's political equality is often justified on grounds of democratic justice and the representation of interests, one might expect women to be more adequately represented in the ranks of national legislatures where democratic processes are more firmly entrenched. But research consistently finds that transitions to democracy are often accompanied by a significant decline in women's political representation (Matland and Montgomery 2003; Yoon 2001). And large cross-national studies have consistently found level of democracy to be statistically insignificant (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Reynolds 1999). Paxton (1997) even found democracy to have a statistically negative effect. As Norris and Inglehart (2001) note, the weakness of the relationship between democracy and women in parliaments worldwide may be due to the continued use of affirmative-action strategies for women's representation in communist systems like Cuba and China.³ Research that has included controls for Marxist-Leninist ideology, lends support to this interpretation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton 1997).

Ideological beliefs form a third important explanation for levels of female participation in parliament. While a favorable political system may be present alongside an adequate supply of qualified female candidates, cultural norms may still hinder women's opportunities to participate in politics (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2001; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Several recent studies have focused explicitly on the impact of ideology on women's parliamentary representation by utilizing a newly available measure of national gender ideology from the *World Values Survey* (Norris and Inglehart 2001; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). These

researchers have not only demonstrated that societal values and beliefs play an important role in women's access to political power throughout the world, but that ideology may have stronger effects on female parliamentary representation than political or structural forces.

The Traditional Model in the Developing Context

While countless studies have examined the relative significance of socioeconomic, political, and ideological variables, the success of these models in explaining the variation across nations is far from uniform. One explanation for this irregularity is that analyses are typically limited to industrial democracies. This is partly a function of data availability, as measurement on key indicators is often lacking for the least developed countries. While women's political participation in developing countries has been explored through case studies, it is only recently that research has begun to include less developed or low-income countries in cross-national research. In these studies, however, explanatory power decreases, and newly incorporated measures of development and industrialization consistently fail to reach statistical significance (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Oakes and Almquist 1993; Paxton 1997; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Reynolds 1999).⁴ This suggests that an explicit examination of low-income countries, and the factors shaping women's representation in those countries, is needed.

Matland (1998) takes a first step toward resolving this deficiency in the literature through a split analysis of 24 OECD countries and 16 lesser-developed democracies. He finds that women's representation does not operate the same in less developed democracies. While a PR system, labor force participation, and a better comparative cultural standing are each found to have significant positive effects among the wealthy industrialized nations, these are not significant in the less developed sample.⁵ Matland (1998) also examines several other variables that could plausibly impact female parliamentary representation in lesser-developed countries

and found none to be significant. But these variables do not address the unique conditions present in developing countries, and it is important to note that Matland's (1998) examination was limited to democratic LDCs. We should not ignore the almost 2 billion women living under authoritarian or semi-democratic regimes with limited political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2004). Even in these societies, women's political representation has important symbolic effects (High-Pippert and Comer 1998; Johnson, Kabuchu, and Vusiya 2003; Phillips 1995).⁶ Therefore, it is necessary to extend analysis to other types of regimes.⁷

Because research has not explained variation across developing countries with conventional variables, I introduce alternative concepts and measures that may be important for low-income countries. These include internal armed conflict and international linkages, measured through the presence of INGOs and treaty ratification.

Alternative Explanations for Women's Political Representation in Low-Income Countries

Because crisis situations encourage elite turnover and offer new routes to power, elite theorists and researchers have long suggested that crises create opportunities in which women may gain political representation (Goetz 1995; Lipman-Blumen 1973; Putnam 1976). In addition, case studies have demonstrated that under conditions of change that undermine tradition, women in Third World countries may rise to political leadership positions (Chaney 1973; Saint-Germain 1993). However, feminist scholars and other researchers have countered that during periods of reconciliation, women are often denied access to peace negotiation processes and historically, women have been unable to translate gains made during periods of crisis into post-conflict political representation. Overall, it is difficult to adjudicate between these opposing positions because research on the effects of armed conflict on female political representation has been limited to case studies and comparative work involving a few countries.

Theoretically, internal armed conflict may positively affect both the supply of and the demand for women.⁸ First, war has historically allowed women to operate outside of the constraints of traditional gender norms, and women may gain access to roles that were previously closed to them. For example, in post-conflict Kosova, women are involved in the new police force, in projects to dismantle mines, and in running farms and businesses (Corrin 2002). Officially recognized wartime heroism may also be an important factor for the rise of women to future positions of power (Denitch 1981). Conflict situations may also cause women to enter the public realm through activity in social movements or the formation of women's organizations. In conflict situations, women create campaigns and demonstrations, institute human rights reporting, lobby for ceasefires, and build networks to care for refugees and support victims of war (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). Women active in social movements may pursue formal political careers once conflict has subsided. For example, many South African women who were active in the anti-apartheid and women's movements were later incorporated into the government (Kumar 2001). Many authors have pointed to the NRM's guerrilla war as a key factor that thrust a generation of Ugandan women into politics (Boyd 1989; Tripp 1994; Goetz 1995; Pankhurst 2002).

Internal conflict may also positively affect the demand for female candidates by facilitating ideological change. As Sambanis (2002) aptly suggests, civil war is "a disruption of social norms that is unparalleled in domestic politics" (217). Groups struggling for independence or to overthrow the current regime often put forth an alternative vision of society, and women's activism may ensure that expanded women's rights becomes part of that vision. For example, during the mid-19th Century, the Taiping Peasant Rebellion in China included demands for sexual equality, and where it won control, foot-binding was banned and women

were given governmental positions (Chafetz and Dworkin 1986:137). Women's rights were also recognized as significant for the revolutionary movements' present and future success in Nicaragua and El Salvador (Labao 1990).

Following revolution or large-scale internal conflict, the institutions of a society may be completely re-constituted or political parties may realign, altering the demand structure in ways positive for women. Women have succeeded better than men in identifying a commonality and uniting as victims across boundaries of nation, class, religion, and ethnicity (Bloomfield et al. 2003). Therefore, in post-conflict situations, women may constitute an important coalition. For example, at the Somali National Peace Conference, women presented themselves as a 'sixth clan' (delegations came from four major clans and a coalition of minor ones) that reached beyond ethnicity to a "vision of gender equality" (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002:78).

While armed conflict may provide political opportunities for women, feminist scholars often indict revolutions and liberation movements as inimical to women's interests (Moghadam 1995). Although women often play a crucial role at the initial stages of resistance to authoritarian rule (Jaquette 1994), and gender differences may be suspended during times of conflict, there is evidence that women find it hard to convert their activities into political representation once conventional political activity resumes (Geisler 1995; Waylen 1994). Women held combatant roles in the revolutionary movements of Algeria, China, Nicaragua, Rhodesia, Russia, the U.S., Vietnam, and Yugoslavia; yet in each of these cases following the conflict's resolution, women left the military and returned to more traditional roles (De Pauw 1981; Enloe 1980; Denich 1981; Geisler 1995; Goldman 1982).

One explanation for women's difficulty in converting wartime activity to peacetime gains is that women are largely denied access to peace negotiation processes and representation in

decision-making bodies (Bloomfield et al. 2003). For example, despite the fact that as many as 30 percent of the fighters of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are women, FARC included only one woman among its representatives to official negotiations with the Colombian government. Therefore, after conflict has subsided, women's organizing efforts, as well as their roles as combatants and political leaders in national liberation movements, are ignored.

Based on the above research, I suggest three broad explanations for variation in the effects of war and revolution on women's incorporation into national politics: timing, contestation, and scale. First, if crisis occurs in a society in 1945, this may lead to vastly different opportunities for women than if the window of political opportunity comes available in 1975 or 1995. Just as countries that obtained independence after 1930 incorporated female suffrage into their nation-state identity (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997), I propose that crises and wars following the rise of modern feminism or its increased penetration into low-income nations may lead to the establishment of more gender-inclusive systems. This hypothesis is supported by the case of Namibia, where Bauer (2004) argues that the timing of the country's struggle for independence, which was finally reached in 1990, is an important factor in women's successful post-war political outcomes. Therefore, the reconstitution of government following widespread conflict, revolution, or war may prove an important vehicle for the entry of women into national politics if that reconstitution has taken place in recent history.

Second, internal wars may be generally classified as either territorial or governmental in nature (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Territorial disputes such as wars of secession or autonomy involve mismatched views between parties concerning the status of territory. Government wars, on the other hand, involve incompatible positions concerning the type of political system, the

replacement of the central government, or the change of its composition. I suggest that while territorial wars may thrust women into the political realm, government wars are more likely to cause new constitutions to be drafted, political structures to be altered, and political parties to realign. Thus, I propose that governmental wars are more likely to create political opportunities for women's entry into politics.

Third, the size of a conflict may have important ramifications for women's post-war outcomes. Large-scale wars may be more likely to force change than smaller-scale armed conflict. The factors that are likely to affect women's outcomes—political mobilization, military activity, ideological change, and changes to government structure or composition—are all more likely to occur as casualties as wars grow in size and duration.

In addition to the internal forces that may create opportunities for women, I suggest that international linkages may also impact female parliamentary representation in low-income countries. Ties to the world society, which may be measured through treaty ratification or through the presence of International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs), may have a profound impact on local situations. World polity theorists argue that cross-national cultural forces play a key causal role in forming a state's characteristics and actions (e.g. Meyer et al 1997; Meyer and Hannan 1979; Thomas et al 1987). While states are often considered to be independent actors that develop policies and practices based upon unique cultures, histories, and political structures, world polity theory suggests that world culture encourages countries to adopt similar strategies for addressing common problems. World organizations are viewed as "primary instruments of shared modernity," disseminating standards and practices (Meyer et al 1997:161), and international conventions and treaties often provide declarations of common causes and blueprints for change. Recent research has yielded empirical support for this perspective,

revealing strong effects of involvement in international organizations on state policy in a variety of areas (e.g. Bradley and Ramirez 1996; Finnemore 1999; Frank 1999; Frank and McEneaney 1999; Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992).

One indicator of world polity ties is ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), also called the Women's Convention. In addition to signifying ties to the world polity, the ratification of CEDAW may also serve as a proxy for the penetration of the transnational feminist movement. CEDAW identifies the need to confront the social causes of women's inequality by addressing "all forms" of discrimination against women, including violations of civil, political, economic, and cultural rights. While the United Nations has numerous international instruments that address women's rights, CEDAW emphasizes that the pervasive and systematic nature of discrimination against women demands a legal response. Parties are urged to introduce measures of affirmative action designed to promote gender equality and to pursue national policies and programs to ensure effective implementation of the legislation. Therefore, through ratification of CEDAW, nations declare a common goal of gender equality while pledging to pursue policies and practices to remedy current disparities.

While prior research has not explicitly explored the effect of world polity ties on female parliamentary representation, two cross-national analyses have included the ratification of CEDAW as a measure of ideology (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton 1997). While Kenworthy and Malami (1999) found CEDAW to have a statistically significant effect, the results are sensitive to outliers. This has led some researchers to suggest that the ratification of CEDAW is a highly political decision that may have little to do with general attitudes about women (Paxton and Kunovich 2003). In addition, while a nation may succeed in ratifying

CEDAW, implementing and fulfilling the provisions of the convention at the domestic level may prove to be a much more difficult task (Holt 1991). This is evident in that by March 2004, only seven countries (including the U.S.) had failed to ratify the measure, while women remain strikingly underrepresented in many of the world's parliaments. CEDAW may, nevertheless, be important for women struggling in low-income countries, where political structures may be less entrenched.

Another measure of ties to the world polity is the presence of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). The effect of international organizations may be understood both actively and passively. First, recent research has detailed the active role played by international organizations in the promotion of women's rights by framing the issues and shaping the agenda (Berkovitch 2002; Joachim 2003). In some cases, INGOs may also successfully challenge local cultural norms that affect women, such as female genital cutting (Boyle, McMorris, and Gomez 2002). Organizations like Search for Common Ground, International Alert, and US Institute for Peace provide training for women to develop negotiation skills and leadership (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002), and as of 1993, approximately 10 percent of international nongovernmental social change organizations focused explicitly on women's rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998:11).

Yet the effect of INGO ties is also conceived in a much more passive sense. Because international organizations serve as carriers of global culture, even scientific and friendship organizations constitute important bridges to international norms. Societies with more INGOs are therefore more likely to adopt global scripts regardless of INGO type. However, it is important to recognize that while many INGOs seek to bring about change in human rights, the environment, women's rights, peace, development, and self-determination (Smith 1997), others

reflect and reinforce the status quo. Powerful individuals and groups in various countries form transnational organizations to formulate policies that they believe will benefit their interests and values, and these organizations may counter progressive ideas and attitudes put forth by other INGOs.

INGOs may also proliferate in the very circumstances that are most detrimental to female parliamentary representation. In a discussion of women in politics in Africa, Staudt (1986) argues that educated professional women see that they may only enter politics on terms set by a male elite that uses women's political energy for their own ends (Geisler 1995). Lacking alternatives, professional African women have, "retreated with their grievances into the non-governmental organizations (NGO) sector, where women's groups and funding from international donors abound" (Staudt 1986:201). This pattern in developing countries may mirror arguments by some feminist activists, who have renounced the state as a possible vehicle for change (Stetson 1995). Therefore, ties to the world polity may present women with alternative paths to seek change, and decrease the number of women pursuing formal political power.

DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODOLOGY

Estimation Strategy

Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, I first examine the political, socioeconomic, and cultural determinants of cross-national variation in the share of parliamentary seats held by women. Then, I apply this base model across 36 high-income, 86 middle-income, and 63 low-income countries. This comparative design allows for assessment of traditional models when applied to both developed and lesser-developed nations. Countries are placed into income categories according to the World Bank's 2000 designations.⁹ Because the vast majority of the

high-income sample is comprised of Western Industrialized countries, the high-income model omits each of the regional dummies, and only tests for differences in Scandinavian countries.

The second step of the analyses explores patterns for lesser-developed countries specifically, and the extent to which conflict and international linkages may influence variation. I focus on 63 low-income nations, which are concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia. Using OLS regression, I examine the effects of armed conflict, INGOs, and ratification of CEDAW on female parliamentary representation. I check the robustness of my findings through the use of partial plots and a variety of other diagnostics (leverage (hat), Cook's D, DFFits, DFBetas, etc.) for all of the variables in the final models (Bollen and Jackman 1990). Compiling these results led to the identification of several potential outliers, including Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda. These cases are removed from the analysis individually and in groups, and significant differences are reported.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in both stages of my analysis is the percentage of female members elected to the lower or single house of a nation's parliament as of December 31, 2000.¹⁰ Elections took place as early as September 1992, and data were obtained from the Inter-Parliamentary web Page (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2003).¹¹ The percentages range between 0 and 42.7 percent with a mean of 11.5 percent. Of the 186 countries in my sample, the percentage of women in the national legislature was unavailable for Libya, and an additional four countries had no convening legislature in 2000 (Afghanistan, Burma, Comoros, and Somalia) and were therefore coded as missing. All countries in the analysis and the percentage of female members in their parliament are listed in Appendix A.

Stage 1: Structural, Political, and Cultural Variables

I incorporate three structural variables often used in prior research: (1) the percentage of tertiary students that are women, (2) the percentage of the economically active population that are women, and (3) as a measure of industrialization, the log of commercial energy use per capita in 1995 (United Nations Development Program 2000; World Bank 1999). To stay consistent with previous research, I use tertiary education enrollment in the first stage of my research, but for low-income nations, I suggest that the male to female enrollment ratio for secondary education may be more salient.

My base model includes several political variables commonly employed in past cross-national research. I include a dummy variable for whether a country has a proportional representation party-list system and a dummy for whether one of a country's leading political parties has a leftist ideology (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1996). I also include the nation's 1995 score on Bollen's (1998) political democracy index and the timing of female suffrage (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1995), which is also considered a cultural measure of differences in attitudes towards women's role in politics (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Moore and Shackman 1996). Another variable that has both political and ideological interpretations is the Marxist-Leninist dummy, where China, North Korea, Laos, and Viet Nam are coded as 1, and all other nations are coded as 0. Finally, I include a dummy variable for national-level gender quotas, which must be in place by the year in which the election took place (IDEA 2003).

Because specific measures of gender ideology such as those found in the *World Values Survey* are not available for the majority of my 186-country sample, I follow the practice employed by past researchers and use region and religion as cultural proxies. I utilize 7 regional

categories, including Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East (e.g. Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton 1997).¹² In the base model, Western Industrialized nations are the omitted category, and in the middle and low-income samples, Sub-Saharan Africa is the reference category. I use four dummy variables for a country's dominant religion, including Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, and Other (Central Intelligence Agency 2003; Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1996).¹³ The Other category includes Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Indigenous, and mixed-religion countries.

Stage 2 - Internal Conflict and International Linkage Variables

To analyze the effects of armed conflict, I obtained data from the Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 1.10 (Gleditsch et al. 2002), and I coded two separate variables. The first, measuring internal war, is the number of years during the period of 1985 to 1994 in which there was internal armed conflict reaching at least 1,000 battle deaths per year.¹⁴ The second variable measures minor or intermediate conflict and reflects the years in which internal armed conflict took place, but battle deaths did not reach the 1,000 mark. I also collected information from Gleditsch et al. (2002) on the distinction between governmental and territorial wars.

For INGOs, I obtained data from the *International Yearbook of Organizations* (Union of International Associations 1995), which lists the number of international nongovernmental organizations in each country of the world for 1995. I also include logged GDP per capita for 1995 (World Bank 1999), an important control variable when considering world polity ties (Beckfield 2003). Finally, I coded a dummy variable for ratification of the Women's Convention (CEDAW) by time of the election, where states that have not yet ratified the Convention are the reference category.¹⁵

Missing Data

Out of the 191 independent states of the world in the year 2000, I was able to collect data for 189 countries. Brunei, Omar, and Qatar have never elected national legislative bodies and are therefore excluded from the analyses. Across the remaining 186 cases, I account for missing data using multiple imputation, one of the two best approaches to handling missing data (Allison 2002).¹⁶ Each imputation model incorporates all variables used in the regression model as well as several others, which are included to improve the accuracy of the imputed values. The additional variables are highly correlated (over 0.70) with the four variables that have the vast majority of missing cases: industrialization (log commercial energy use per capita), the percent women in tertiary education, the percent women in secondary education, and log GDP per capita. Additional variables included are the log of carbon dioxide emissions in 1995, the percentage of female law school students in 1990, the percentage of women in all occupations in 1990, and the percentage of female professionals in 1990 (United Nations Common Database 2003; United Nations Development Program 2000). Allison (2002) argues that cases with missing data on the dependent variable must be also included, so I include the full 186 cases in my imputation models. To ensure that my results could be replicated, I used the seed number 2564 during all multiple imputation procedures. Finally, it is important to note that multiple imputation techniques rest on the assumption that missing data are Missing At Random (MAR).¹⁷

RESULTS

In Table 1, I present the results from the first stage of my analysis, replicating a single base model across three levels of development. The first model, which incorporates the entire sample of 186 countries, performs much like past cross-national research. Countries with a Marxist-Leninist ideology, those with party-list proportional representation systems, and those where one of the primary political parties is leftist have significantly more women in their national

legislatures. As expected, Scandinavian countries have more women in parliament, while countries that are primarily Orthodox have fewer women. National gender quotas, women's labor force participation, and tertiary education enrollment also increase the share of seats occupied by women, but the effect sizes are small or only marginally significant.¹⁸

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The second column in Table 1 presents the results for the high-income group. Clearly, the base model performs well when applied to this sample of countries, predicting 76% of the variance. Because these countries are concentrated in Europe and North America, the regional dummies are not included, and the religion variables serve as a proxy for cultural differences. In the high-income sample, countries with Roman Catholic, Orthodox, or Other dominant religions have significantly fewer women in parliament than Protestant nations. Another cultural proxy, earlier women's suffrage, shows significant positive effects among high-income countries, and in countries with a major leftist party, women hold a greater share of seats. This model also replicates the consistent finding that among Western Industrialized nations, proportional representation party-list systems increase women's numbers. The effect size is over three times that found in the full sample, where PR-PL systems have on average 8.19 percent more women in their parliaments than nations with alternative electoral systems.

The picture changes slightly when middle-income countries are analyzed, as the base model only explains about 36 percent of the variance across the sample. Among middle-income countries, Asian and Middle Eastern countries display significantly lower levels of female parliamentary participation than Sub-Saharan Africa. It appears that it is among middle-income nations that higher female enrollment in tertiary education has a significant positive effect, suggesting that structural forces may play important roles during middle stages of development,

but the effect is only marginally significant. Middle-income countries with a major leftist party also display higher rates of female political representation than single-party or Right-wing governments.

The base model explains only 25 percent of the variance across low-income countries, and only the dummy variable for Marxist-Leninist ideology is significant. Although this variable has sometimes been overlooked by past researchers (e.g. Reynolds 1999), the low-income model demonstrates that Marxist-Leninist ideology has a great amount of explanatory power for developing nations and may explain why large cross-national studies that included the dummy Marxist-Leninist dummy (e.g. Paxton 1997; Kenworthy and Malami 1999) performed better overall than studies that failed to include the measure. The low-income model supports Matland (1998), finding that we clearly know very little about which factors impact female parliamentary representation in the developing world.¹⁹

I next explore new explanations for cross-national variation in women's parliamentary representation across developing countries. Appendix B presents the zero-order correlations and descriptive statistics for variables used in the low-income models, including variable means and standard errors prior to and following imputation. Table 3 presents four low-income models, the first of which is a new base model. I substitute tertiary education with secondary enrollment rates and drop each of the political variables found to be insignificant in the first stage of the analysis.²⁰ I do, however, continue to control for level of democracy. Because GDP per capita is a necessary control when using INGOs as a measure of world polity ties and is an alternative measure of industrialization, I also substitute GDP per capita for commercial energy use per capita. GDP per capita has a significant negative effect.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Model 2 adds the international linkage variables. While CEDAW ratification fails to reach statistical significance, INGOs display a marginally significant effect. However, variable operates in an unexpected direction, where countries with more INGOs have fewer women in parliament. While the negative effect is contrary to what one might expect, the effect size is small (-0.0065), suggesting that a greater number of INGOs in a country has, in actuality, little effect. In fact, increasing the number of INGOs by 150 would only correspond to a single percentage point decrease in the percentage of women in a nation's parliament. Furthermore, auxiliary analysis reveals that the effect is not robust. Once a single outlying case (India) is removed, the effect is no longer significant.

Model 3 removes the international linkage variables and tests the effects of internal war and minor or intermediate armed conflict on female parliamentary representation. As hypothesized, internal war has significant positive effects. Holding all other variables constant, each additional year of war increases the share of parliamentary seats occupied by women by 1.2 percent.²¹ However, years of minor and intermediate conflict failed to reach significance.²² The incorporation of the armed conflict variables also affects GDP per capita, which is no longer significant, and democracy, which displays a statistically significant positive effect.²³ However, the effect size of democracy is small. A 15-point increase on Bollen's democracy score is only associated with a 1 percent increase in women's parliamentary representation.

Model 4 incorporates both the international linkage and armed conflict variables. When the armed conflict variables are included, the negative effect of INGOs is no longer statistically significant, but the positive effect of democracy remains significant. While level of democracy and women's parliamentary participation have a negative correlation in the zero order (See Appendix A), the relationship becomes positive and significant once internal war is controlled,

suggesting that the original correlation is spurious. Because civil war over the 1985 to 1994 period depresses the level of democracy as measured in 1995, the inclusion of civil war is necessary to observe the positive effect of democracy on women's parliamentary representation. In this final model, almost 47 percent of variance in the sample is explained.

Table 3 compares internal wars in the low-income sample across the two types: government and territory wars. As expected, government wars are associated with greater changes in women's subsequent parliamentary representation than territory wars.²⁴ While countries experiencing territory wars during the period only gain an average of 1.9% women by 2000, countries experiencing government wars gain an average of 7.2%. The average change following government wars is depressed by the negative change experienced by Nicaragua. Yet a high pre-war percentage of women in parliament can be attributed to a prior war in 1979 that brought a Marxist government to power. Furthermore, in 2001, women returned to prior levels of representation, when 20.7% women were elected to Nicaragua's national legislature.²⁵

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I suggested that while some cross-national work has successfully identified structural, political, and ideological factors that influence female parliamentary representation in Western industrialized countries, we know little about the processes at work in developing countries. Extending Matland's (1998) research, I demonstrated that the measures commonly employed in cross-national analyses of women in the world's parliaments fail to explain differences across a sample of sixty-three low-income countries. I then argued that two sets of factors, internal armed conflict and international linkages, could be important predictors of variation across developing countries. While I found that ties to the world polity do not have

consistent significant effects on women's representation, civil wars positively affect the share of parliamentary seats occupied by women.

Periods of war affect women differently than men. While men more often die on the battlefield, women disproportionately suffer crimes such as rape, forced prostitution, and other atrocities. Women in post-conflict situations are more often displaced, as widows struggle to hold onto property in societies that do not recognize their rights. However, my research suggests that post-conflict situations present windows of political opportunity through which women are gaining political power. At the intersection of these two social problems, women's political underrepresentation and the devastating effects of civil war, there may be hope for women seeking political access.

When considering women's post-war political outcomes, the critical factor is whether the conflict is likely to displace those in power and create political openings. Although minor- and intermediate-level conflicts do not affect women's subsequent political outcomes, additional years of large-scale war are associated with more women in parliament. Larger wars may be more likely to cause women to join the military, form women's groups to organize for peace, or otherwise be propelled into the political sphere. In addition, wars that contest the government rather than territory are more likely to create political opportunities for women. As rival groups fight for control of a state, women may be perceived as less threatening or may be better able to bridge ethnic cleavages.

Another reason that women's post-war experiences in this research may differ from those reported in past studies is timing. I have argued that recent war may provide greater opportunities to women due to the penetration of worldwide feminist movements. Openings in recent years may have allowed women opportunities that they could not have seized in previous

decades. However, longitudinal analysis is needed to explicitly investigate this hypothesis. Furthermore, the effects of the civil wars under investigation here may not be lasting. While women in the post-conflict societies of the late 1990s appear to be more successful than their predecessors in gaining access to political representation, we must return to this question in the future to determine whether these gains stand the test of time. Is the road to power through armed conflict no longer blocked for women? Or once peace is institutionalized, will women in these societies be forced to walk the more familiar path of retreat towards “tradition”?

While I investigate the effects of internal armed conflict, future research should also consider the effects of external or internationalized conflicts on women’s political representation. As recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest, war may substantially alter women’s political situations if external powers create openings. Yet women’s political positions in other countries involved in the war such as the United States and the United Kingdom did not change appreciably. Again, the key variable to consider is the toppling and reconstitution of the government. The first Gulf War did not produce openings for women in Iraq because Saddam Hussein’s government was left in place.

In addition to the direct effects of war on women in politics, measures of conflict may be important controls. While theory has long suggested that higher numbers of women will be found in the national legislatures of established democracies than of transitional or fledgling democracies, empirical research has failed to support this claim. However, once the effects of civil war are controlled, level of democracy is found to have a significant and positive effect. On the other hand, the significant negative effect of GDP per capita disappears once conflict variables are controlled, suggesting that the negative effect of GDP is likely capturing the economic ramifications of large-scale internal war.

Although I find little support for the effects of international linkages, future researchers should continue to investigate these factors. Although my analysis found no effect of number of INGOs, this may simply be a product of measurement. Because INGOs may seek societal change or reinforce the status quo, counts of transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) may be a better measure. The size of INGOs may also be important, as a large number of small cross-national organizations may have little effect. Furthermore, recent research suggests that simple counts of INGOs may reflect other dimensions of stratification in the world polity such as world system position or country civilization (Beckfield 2003). More specific data on the type of INGOs present in each country is therefore needed.

My research supports prior claims that CEDAW is a highly politicized decision that has little practical impact on women's lives (e.g. Paxton and Kunovich 2003). The international community may be successful in exerting pressure upon states to sign or ratify the measure, but less successful enforcing the measure's provisions. For example, the Taliban government of Afghanistan was one of CEDAW's original signatories. Yet clearly, the government was not committed to advancing women's political equality. Therefore, in addition to supporting women's education and movement into the labor force, the international community should target resources towards advancing women's position in post-conflict societies. In January 2004, the United Nations held an expert meeting on "Enhancing Women's Participation in Electoral Processes in Post-Conflict Countries." Efforts such as these may prove more successful than pressuring elites to ratify treaties relating to women's rights.

Finally, the split-sample analysis here suggests that different forces may aid women's rise in politics at different levels of development. The results challenge stratification theories that assert women's economic and social equality must precede political equality. In some of the

poorest nations, women have gained political representation without equality in other domains. Clearly, the relationship between women's structural and political position in society requires further investigation. Thus, while I have taken the first step towards modeling the processes at work in low-income nations like Rwanda, other theories may help specify factors that could account for women's rise to power in developing countries more completely.

In many parts of the world, the representation of women remains "little more than a blip on the male political landscape" (Reynolds 1999:547). But even across the less developed world, women seeking political office have made significant gains. While we know from research on democratization that new political institutions often lead to declines in women's political representation, the devastating effects of war may also provide opportunities for a new political voice for women. Although a large number of international organizations in a country or ratification of CEDAW will not ensure women's political access, the international community can still benefit women by pressuring for women's inclusion in post-conflict situations.

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Table 1. OLS Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Base Model Across Income Groups

	Full Sample	High	Middle	Low
Intercept	3.810 (8.469)	25.904 (30.811)	0.762 (10.212)	3.757 (17.028)
Scandinavia	12.740 *** (3.005)	7.550 ^t (4.125)		
Asia and the Pacific	-8.788 *** (2.195)		-6.522 * (2.646)	-3.841 (2.464)
Eastern Europe	-6.517 *** (1.960)		-4.810 (3.214)	-0.624 (4.617)
Middle East / N Africa	-6.569 * (3.017)		-7.744 ^t (4.444)	-0.458 (5.546)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-3.216 * (2.316)			
Latin America	-4.712 * (1.920)		-2.266 (2.847)	-4.277 (7.006)
Muslim	-2.523 (1.769)	-11.524 (14.916)	-1.224 (4.038)	-1.249 (2.847)
Roman Catholic	-2.204 (1.511)	-5.596 (3.852)	-0.154 (2.351)	-1.389 (5.323)
Orthodox	-6.340 ** (2.207)	-14.208 * (6.290)	-5.500 (3.352)	-6.720 (5.091)
Other Religion	-2.284 (1.715)	-11.520 * (5.422)	-1.326 (3.230)	-0.340 (2.776)
Labor Force Participation	0.109 (0.072)	0.024 (0.327)	0.124 (0.106)	0.175 (0.109)
Tertiary Education	0.111 (0.077)	0.133 (0.218)	0.203 ^t (0.112)	0.087 (0.155)
Industrialization	-0.484 (1.151)	-3.120 (3.488)	-0.467 (1.320)	-0.934 (3.014)
Democracy	0.025 (0.024)	-0.003 (0.121)	-0.026 (0.033)	0.022 (0.035)
Left Party	3.162 * (1.250)	2.733 (5.179)	5.466 ** (1.974)	2.390 (2.999)
PR-Party List	2.483 * (1.118)	8.193 ** (2.992)	0.742 (1.626)	3.708 (3.592)
Quotas	2.324 (1.462)	-0.633 (7.541)	1.589 (2.419)	2.311 (2.521)
Marxist-Leninist	15.547 *** (3.750)			13.445 * (5.296)
Women's Suffrage	0.069 * (0.032)	0.142 ^t (0.076)	0.039 (0.059)	-0.006 (0.082)
N	186	36	86	63
Adjusted R ² (Average)	0.61	0.76	0.36	0.25

* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, ^tp<0.10; all significance tests are two-tailed.

TABLE 2: Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors for Low-Income Models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	-5.051 (8.229)	-1.295 (8.020)	-3.810 (9.398)	1.698 (10.660)
Asia and the Pacific	-3.571 (2.530)	-2.666 (2.486)	-3.369 (2.250)	-3.532 (2.377)
Eastern Europe	-0.967 (3.839)	-2.177 (3.888)	0.343 (3.668)	-0.333 (3.463)
Middle East	1.902 (4.608)	2.889 (4.602)	-0.515 (5.312)	-2.731 (4.589)
Latin America	-2.953 (8.121)	-3.414 (6.318)	-5.001 (6.476)	-7.329 ^t (5.656)
Muslim	-0.683 (2.845)	-1.744 (2.492)	-1.687 (2.710)	-2.368 (3.045)
Catholic	-1.859 (6.840)	-0.946 (5.308)	-0.370 (4.683)	0.641 (4.912)
Orthodox	-6.842 (4.747)	-6.796 (4.409)	-6.813 (4.350)	-7.036 ^t (3.899)
Other	-0.802 (2.626)	-1.572 (2.506)	-1.328 (2.113)	-2.564 (2.254)
Labor Force , 1990	0.205 (0.122)	0.209 ^t (0.108)	0.149 (0.129)	0.079 (0.169)
Secondary Education, 1990	0.183 (0.115)	0.196 ^t (0.114)	0.132 (0.113)	0.091 (0.101)
GDP per capita, 1995	-0.883 ^t (0.482)	-1.764 [*] (0.727)	-0.316 (0.515)	-0.660 (0.745)
Marxist-Leninist	16.723 ^{***} (4.540)	13.318 [*] (5.132)	18.282 ^{***} (4.254)	19.646 ^{***} (5.036)
Democracy, 1995	0.041 (0.031)	0.042 (0.034)	0.049 ^t (0.027)	0.057 [*] (0.029)
INGOs, 1995		-0.007 ^t (0.004)		-0.007 (0.005)
UN Ratification CEDAW by 1998		0.867 (2.753)		2.633 (2.228)
Internal War, 1985-1994			1.194 ^{**} (0.390)	1.307 ^{***} (0.346)
Intermediate / Minor Conflict			0.506 (0.452)	0.468 (0.707)
N	63	63	63	63
Adjusted R ²	0.31	0.38	0.46	0.47

* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, ^tp<0.10; all significance tests are two-tailed

Table 3. Internal Wars in Low-Income Countries by Type and Women's Parliamentary Representation

Government Wars¹		Women in Parliament		
Country	Years	Pre-War ³	2000	Change
Afghanistan	1989-2000	3.7	.	.
Angola	1990-1994	14.5	15.5	1.0
Ethiopia	1976-1991	1.6	7.7	6.1
Liberia	1992	.	7.8	.
Mozambique	1981-1992	12.4	30.0	17.6
Nicaragua	1983-1988	21.6	9.7	-11.9
Rwanda	1991-1992	17.1	25.7	8.6
Somalia	1989-1992	4.0	.	.
Tajikistan	1992-1993	3.0	15.0	12.0
Uganda	1981-1989,1991	0.8	17.8	17.0
<i>Mean</i>	<i>7.0</i>	<i>9.3</i>	<i>17.3</i>	<i>7.2</i>
<i>Std Deviation</i>	<i>5.2</i>	<i>7.7</i>	<i>8.2</i>	<i>10.3</i>

Territory Wars²		Women in Parliament		
Country	Years	Pre-War ³	2000	Change
Azerbaijan	1994	2.0	10.5	8.5
Ethiopia	1974-1991	1.6	7.7	6.1
Georgia	1993	6.3	7.2	0.9
India	1989-1993	7.8	9.0	1.2
Indonesia	1990	12.4	8.0	-4.4
Myanmar	1992-1994	.	.	.
Sudan	1983-1992	8.5	9.7	1.2
<i>Mean</i>	<i>5.4</i>	<i>6.4</i>	<i>8.7</i>	<i>1.9</i>
<i>Std Deviation</i>	<i>6.5</i>	<i>4.1</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>4.5</i>

¹Government wars involve incompatible positions concerning the type of political system, the replacement of the central government, or the change of its composition (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

²Territory wars involve incompatible positions concerning the status of territory, e.g. secession, or autonomy (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

³Data is for year directly prior to start of war, except for Ethiopia, which uses data for 1973-1974 (IPU 1997).

APPENDIX A. Percentage Women in National Legislatures for 186 Countries by Income Group, 2000

High Income		Middle Income (cont.)		Middle Income (cont.)		Low Income (cont.)	
Andorra	7.1	Brazil	5.7	Paraguay	2.5	Ethiopia	7.7
Australia	23.0	Bulgaria	10.8	Peru	20.0	Gambia	2.0
Austria	26.8	Cape Verde	11.1	Philippines	11.3	Georgia	7.2
Bahamas	15.0	Chile	10.8	Poland	13.0	Ghana	9.0
Barbados	10.7	China	21.8	Romania	10.7	Guinea	8.8
Belgium	23.3	Colombia	11.8	Russia	7.7	Guinea-Bissau	7.8
Canada	20.6	Costa Rica	19.3	Samoa	8.2	Haiti	3.6
Cyprus	7.1	Croatia	20.5	Saudi Arabia	0.0	India	9.0
Denmark	37.4	Cuba	27.6	Seychelles	23.5	Indonesia	8.0
Finland	36.5	Czech Republic	15.0	Slovakia	14.0	Kenya	3.6
France	10.9	Djibouti	0.0	South Africa	29.8	Korea, North	20.1
Germany	30.9	Dominica	18.8	Sri Lanka	4.0	(Dem. Rep. of)	
Greece	8.7	Dominican Rep.	16.1	St. Kitts & Nevis	13.3	Kyrgyzstan	2.3
Iceland	34.9	Ecuador	14.6	St. Lucia	11.1	Laos	21.2
Ireland	12.0	Egypt	2.4	St. Vincent	4.8	Lesotho	3.8
Israel	12.5	El Salvador	9.5	Suriname	15.7	Liberia	7.8
Italy	11.1	Equatorial Guinea	5.0	Swaziland	3.1	Madagascar	8.0
Japan	7.3	Estonia	17.8	Syria	10.4	Malawi	9.3
Kuwait	0.0	Fiji	4.3	Thailand	4.8	Mali	12.2
Liechtenstein	4.0	Gabon	9.2	Tonga	0.0	Mauritania	3.8
Luxembourg	16.7	Grenada	26.7	Trinidad &	11.1	Moldova	7.9
Malta	9.2	Guatemala	8.8	Tobago		Mongolia	10.5
Monaco	22.2	Guyana	18.5	Tunisia	11.5	Mozambique	30.0
Netherlands	36.0	Honduras	9.4	Turkey	4.2	Nepal	5.9
New Zealand	30.8	Hungary	8.3	Turkmenistan	26.0	Nicaragua	9.7
Norway	36.4	Iran	3.4	Uruguay	12.1	Niger	1.2
Portugal	17.4	Iraq	7.6	Vanuatu	0.0	Nigeria	3.4
San Marino	13.3	Jamaica	13.3	Venezuela	9.7	Pakistan	2.3
Singapore	6.5	Jordan	0.0	Yugoslavia	7.3	Rwanda	25.7
Slovenia	12.2	Kazakhstan	10.4			Sao Tome	9.1
Spain	28.3	Kiribati	4.8			Senegal	12.1
Sweden	42.7	Korea, South	5.9	Low Income		Sierra Leone	8.8
Switzerland	23.0	(Republic of)		Afghanistan	.	Solomon Islands	2.0
Taiwan	19.0	Latvia	17.0	Angola	15.5	Somalia	.
UAE	0.0	Lebanon	2.3	Armenia	3.1	Sudan	9.7
United Kingdom	18.4	Libya	.	Azerbaijan	10.5	Tajikistan	15.0
United States	14.0	Lithuania	10.6	Bangladesh	9.1	Tanzania	22.2
		Macedonia	6.7	Benin	6.0	(United Rep.)	
Middle Income		Malaysia	10.4	Bhutan	9.3	Togo	4.9
Albania	5.2	Maldives	6.0	Burkina Faso	8.1	Uganda	17.8
Algeria	3.4	Marshall Islands	3.0	Burma (Myanmar)	.	Ukraine	7.8
Antigua & Barbuda	5.3	Mauritius	5.7	Burundi	14.4	Uzbekistan	7.2
Argentina	26.5	Mexico	16.0	Cambodia	7.4	Viet Nam	26.0
Bahrain	0.0	Micronesia	0.0	Cameroon	5.6	Yemen	0.7
Belarus	10.3	Morocco	0.6	Central African		Zaire (Dem. Rep.	12.0
Belize	6.9	Namibia	25.0	Republic	7.3	of the Congo)	
Bolivia	11.5	Palau	0.0	Chad	2.4	Zambia	10.1
Bosnia-Herzog.	7.1	Panama	9.9	Comoros	.	Zimbabwe	9.3
Botswana	17.0	Papua New	1.8	Congo	12.0		
		Guinea		Cote d'Ivoire	8.5		
				Eritrea	14.7		

APPENDIX B. Bivariate and Descriptive Statistics for Low-Income Models, With Imputations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
(1) Female MPs	1.000									
(2) Muslim	-0.271	1.000								
(3) Orthodox	-0.111	-0.197	1.000							
(4) Catholic	0.026	-0.197	-0.068	1.000						
(5) Other Religion	0.200	-0.442	-0.152	-0.152	1.000					
(6) Latin America	-0.073	-0.137	-0.047	0.695	-0.106	1.000				
(7) Asia	0.033	-0.088	-0.139	-0.139	0.478	-0.097	1.000			
(8) Eastern Europe	-0.055	0.067	0.638	-0.106	-0.238	-0.074	-0.218	1.000		
(9) Middle East	-0.113	0.239	-0.047	-0.047	-0.106	-0.033	-0.097	-0.074	1.000	
(10) Marxist-Leninist	0.452	-0.170	-0.058	-0.058	0.383	-0.040	0.418	-0.091	-0.040	1.000
(11) Democracy	-0.024	-0.301	0.189	0.044	0.048	0.050	-0.024	-0.029	-0.239	-0.295
(12) Labor Force	0.290	-0.355	0.241	0.012	0.102	-0.103	0.025	0.215	-0.463	0.260
(13) Secondary Education	0.150	-0.312	0.275	0.082	-0.039	0.205	-0.035	0.380	-0.174	0.007
(14) Industrialization	0.017	-0.134	0.193	-0.170	-0.122	-0.095	-0.011	0.367	-0.160	0.084
(15) GDP per capita	-0.195	-0.023	0.110	-0.005	-0.165	0.094	-0.226	0.182	-0.094	-0.124
(16) INGOs	-0.053	-0.059	-0.107	0.024	-0.027	0.005	0.106	-0.298	-0.005	-0.124
(17) CEDAW Ratification	0.140	-0.206	0.099	0.099	0.113	0.069	-0.140	0.156	-0.203	-0.139
(18) Internal War	0.233	0.071	-0.091	-0.002	0.022	0.082	0.024	-0.128	0.248	-0.104
(19) Minor Armed Conflict	0.024	0.224	-0.046	0.019	0.019	-0.009	0.251	-0.133	-0.009	-0.048
Mean	9.50	0.37	0.06	0.06	0.25	0.03	0.22	0.14	0.03	0.05
Mean, Imputed	9.28	0.37	0.06	0.06	0.25	0.03	0.22	0.14	0.03	0.05
St. Deviation	6.31	0.49	0.25	0.25	0.44	0.18	0.42	0.35	0.18	0.21
St. Dev., Imputed	6.52	0.48	0.24	0.24	0.44	0.18	0.42	0.35	0.18	0.21
Minimum	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maximum	30.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
N	59	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63
Imputed Cases	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	
(12) Labor Force	0.136	1.000								
(13) Secondary Education	-0.025	0.016	1.000							
(14) Industrialization	0.030	-0.008	0.476	1.000						
(15) GDP per capita	0.194	0.017	0.138	0.310	1.000					
(16) INGOs	0.119	-0.010	-0.037	-0.129	-0.600	1.000				
(17) CEDAW Ratification	0.088	0.303	0.113	-0.320	-0.166	0.203	1.000			
(18) Internal War	-0.161	-0.271	0.081	-0.060	-0.282	0.152	-0.224	1.000		
(19) Minor Armed Conflict	-0.345	0.066	-0.030	-0.252	-0.311	0.213	0.049	0.159	1.000	
Mean	47.44	40.20	38.45	6.20	2.46	324.1	0.87	1.03	1.16	
Mean, Imputed	48.00	39.87	38.82	6.25	2.49	324.1	0.87	1.01	1.10	
St. Deviation	30.20	9.31	9.15	0.61	1.55	260.7	0.34	2.20	2.02	
St. Dev, Imputed	30.13	10.14	8.67	0.70	1.58	259.0	0.33	2.18	2.02	
Minimum	0.00	18.22	18.00	5.26	-1.80	24.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Maximum	99.50	52.56	60.00	8.05	6.46	1518	1.00	8.00	8.00	
N	62	29	51	34	52	63	63	61	61	
Imputed Cases	1	34	12	29	11	0	0	2	2	

APPENDIX C. Footnotes.

¹ Oakes and Almquist (1993) and Paxton and Kunovich (2003) found significant effects of female labor force participation, while Paxton (1997) and Kenworthy and Malami (1999) did not. Kenworthy and Malami (1999) found percent women in professional occupations to be statistically significant; however, Paxton (1997) did not find women's share of management positions to be significant.

² In PR systems, the parties publish lists of candidates and are therefore more conscious of balancing their tickets to attract support from different constituencies. Moreover, powerful men may remain on party lists, so the appearance of female candidates is less threatening than in a single-member district system (like the U.S.), where parties only nominate a single candidate. Only two broad cross-national studies failed to find PR systems to be significant (Moore and Shackman 1996; Oakes and Almquist 1993).

³ Parliaments of these Marxist-Leninist regimes were largely ineffective, and after 1990, when the parliaments of the former Soviet Union became much more powerful, there was a corresponding sharp drop in their number of women (United Nations 1992; Matland and Montgomery 2003; Saxonberg 2000).

⁴ When expanding Western models to larger samples, many studies have simply included additional measures for level of development or industrialization. The insignificance of these variables suggests that women's political representation does not exhibit a simple linear relationship with development. While the most industrialized countries do have, on average, higher levels of women's representation, significant variation still exists across less developed countries. Furthermore, women's parliamentary representation in the middle and low-income categories have similar means (10.1 and 9.5%) and standard deviations (7.4 and 6.3%), suggesting that in some nations women gained significant representation without industrialization and conversely, that economic development does not ensure that women will make political gains.

⁵ While Matland's (1998) original model did find statistically significant effects for women's comparative cultural standing and level of development, this finding does not hold up to his robustness checks. When either variable is dropped from the equation, the coefficients are cut in half, and the variables are no longer statistically significant.

⁶ While exclusion from political elites may reinforce wider assumptions of a group's inferiority, representation may empower women through role model effects or by altering societal perceptions of women's proper roles (High-Pippert and Comer 1998; Phillips 1995; Sawyer 1999, 2000). In the one-party state of Uganda, for example, following the implementation of affirmative action strategies that guarantee women's representation in local village councils, issues such as domestic and sexual abuse, child support, and widow inheritance protection were brought more often to the courts, and women were more engaged in community activities (Johnson, Kabuchu, and Vusiya 2003).

⁷ When analyzing the percentage of women in politics across the world, the question of functional equivalence is sometimes raised. I acknowledge that women's numerical presence in a legislature may mean different things for women's political power in different contexts. But the same may be argued even across developed democracies. What we do know is that across all societies, participation in national politics is highly visible and therefore influences both the perceptions about women's place and the aspirations of women. Having more women suggests that politics is not a man's domain, arguably an important symbol of women's equality across all regimes.

⁸ It is expected that external and internationalized conflicts would have similar effects on women's political outcomes in some instances. Because outcomes for women are likely a product of the interaction between the countries involved, the level of involvement of each country, and the war's outcome, dyadic or other relational analysis may be more appropriate for the study of external or internationalized conflicts.

⁹ There is a significant amount of variation in categorizations of countries by level of development. The World Bank, IMF, United Nations, and individual researchers each have slightly different groupings, and the countries in each category vary even from year to year. For example, in their study of gender inequality and cultural change, Inglehardt and Norris (2003) define three levels of development using the 1998 Human Development Index (HDI). Post-industrial countries have HDI scores 0.900 or higher, industrial countries have moderate HDI scores ranging from 0.899 to 0.740, and agrarian countries are defined as those with HDI values of 0.699 or below. Some countries are arguably miscategorized. South Africa, for example, has well-developed financial, legal, communications, energy, and transport sectors, less than 30% of the country's population is employed in agriculture, and the nation's stock exchange ranks among the 10 largest in the world (CIA Factbook 2002). However, due to high rates of HIV infection that depress South Africa's life expectancy, the country is classified as agrarian. Thus, while it is clear that the world is stratified by development, operationalizing distinct categories is an exceedingly difficult task. To address this problem, I replicate my analyses using several different development splits and footnote changes in effect size or significance level.

¹⁰ In bicameral legislatures, lower houses consistently have more legislative power than upper houses.

¹¹ Since several of the predictors are measured in 1995, I remove the four countries with elections prior to 1995 (Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, Rwanda) in auxiliary analyses. This produces in no substantive changes to my findings.

¹² In the low-income sample, only four countries reside in the regions of Latin America and the Middle East. The removal of these dummies does not significantly affect the analysis.

¹³ While not all previous research has included a separate religion category for Orthodoxy, Paxton and Kunovich (2003) found percent Orthodox to be significant. I continue to include Catholic to facilitate comparison with previous research, but it is important to note that there are only two Roman Catholic countries in the low-income sample. The removal of the Catholic dummy does not affect the significance of other variables in the model.

¹⁴ I use an ordinal measure of armed conflict to determine whether additional years of civil war are associated with higher female representation, but I also tested log years of war and a dummy variable for presence or absence of a war during the time period. I find no significant differences from the results that are reported.

¹⁵ Because it may take time for countries to implement the principles enshrined in CEDAW, I also coded an ordinal measure of the years between CEDAW ratification and the country's election. Substituting the measure for the dummy variable produced no changes to my findings. I also considered attempting to create an ordinal measure based upon whether countries had ratified CEDAW's optional protocol. Although no countries had ratified the optional protocol by the election used for this analysis, future researchers should consider this approach.

¹⁶ Using available data, the imputation procedure generates estimates for each of the missing values, but improving upon deterministic imputation methods, multiple imputation allows a random component to be introduced. However, treating imputed cases like real data would produce artificially low standard errors. To adjust for this problem, the random imputation is carried out several times, producing multiple complete datasets. The variability across imputations is then used to adjust the standard errors upward. (Allison 2002)

¹⁷ While my data are not missing completely at random (MCAR), I do argue that my data meet the MAR criteria, which Allison (2002:4) describes as follows: "Data on Y are said to be missing at random if the probability of missing data on Y is unrelated to the value of Y, *after controlling for other variables in the analysis.*" Allison offers the example of income and marital status, where the MAR assumption would be satisfied if the probability of missing data on income depended on a person's marital status, but within each marital status category, the missing at random assumption is unrelated to income. Along these lines, I argue that the probability of missing data for my structural variables may depend on a country's level of development. Low-income countries may not have the resources to compile these statistics, and because low-income countries may be more likely to have lower average values on these variables, the probability of missing data for these variables may in fact be related to their value. To address this possibility, I include measures in the imputation model such as GDP per capita that identify low-income countries. However, if nations who do not report these statistics are doing so because the statistics are low, my data fail to meet the MAR requirement.

¹⁸ In robustness tests, when commercial energy use per capita is replaced by another measure of industrialization, GDP per capita, the effects of female labor force participation and gender quotas are no longer significant.

¹⁹ Replicating the base model across alternative categorizations of development produces the same pattern. Variables in the base model perform much better for samples of industrialized countries than developing, and very little is known about what factors are salient in the least developed countries. This is accurate across IMF, UN, OECD, and Inglehardt and Norris (2003) development categories.

²⁰ In additional analyses, I included party-list proportional representation, left parties, and national gender quotas in the low-income models, but they were not significant.

²¹ The effect size and significance of the internal war variable is affected by the removal of three suspected outlying cases: Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda. These cases are three of the four non-Marxist states with the highest levels of women's parliamentary participation. When Rwanda and Mozambique are removed, the effect size drops from 1.19 to 0.78, but the effect is still significant at the 0.05-level (0.0193). The removal of Uganda and Mozambique has an even stronger effect, reducing the coefficient to 0.67 and significance to 0.08. However, the removal of Uganda and Rwanda does not affect the conflict variables. When all three variables are removed, the internal war variable falls just outside the range of significance. It is important to note, however, that once potential negative outliers (Cambodia and Ethiopia) are removed alongside the three positive outliers, the effect of internal war is again significant with a coefficient of 0.58.

²² Two cases were suspected outliers when considering the insignificance of the lower and intermediate-level conflict variables: Cambodia and Ethiopia. These cases both have below-average levels of female parliamentary participation. While their removal did not affect the significance of the conflict variables, their removal did increase the level of significance of the international linkage variables, INGOs and CEDAW ratification, and three region and religion dummy variables reach significance: Latin America, Asia, and Other religion.

²³ Auxiliary analyses of the full sample of 186 countries shows that once measures of armed conflict are included, level of democracy has significant positive effects. The apparent suppressor effect of armed conflict on democracy is also robust across specifications of developing countries. Using Inglehart and Norris's (2003) agrarian category, for example, democracy is significant at the 0.05 alpha-level once internal war is included.

²⁴ When territory and government wars are included in the multivariate analysis, government wars display a statistically significant positive effect, while territory wars are insignificant.

²⁵ Looking into the future further suggests a distinction between government and territory wars. If the change statistics are calculated from prior to war to the end of 2003, government wars are associated with an average increase of 13.2% women in parliament, while territory wars are only associated with a 3.1% increase.